The Uppsala School’s most widely spread or known theory was its so-called axiological nihilism, or nihilism of values.This is a non-cognitive moral theory, as opposed to objectivistic moral theories according to which values are predicated to have objective existence and values.2 In essence, Hägerström’s moral theory is an application of his logical, epistemological, and ontological investigations, resulting in a non-cognitive theory of values. Taken together, the conclusions of these investigations result in a basic scientific principle concerning the reach and content of scientific knowledge and scientific argumentation with regard to values, value-judgments, and political discourses,3 see, for example, Parts V-VII below. A leading principle of Hägerström’s moral theory is that knowledge about values as such is deemed impossible:“For all knowledge is a determination of what is real.”4Values insofar as they are used as predicates to objects or acts, only have meaning to us provided that we feel pleasure (lust) or displeasure towards them or a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 241 Moral Philosophy: “moral science may not be a teaching in morals, but only a teaching about morality.”1 part iv, chapter 1 1 moral theory: axiolog ical nihi l i sm 1 Hägerström, “Moral Propositions,” p. 96. Swedish: “moralvetenskapen icke kan vara en lära i moral, utan blott en lära om moralen.”Hägerström,“Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 50. 2 Mautner,“Inledning,” in Moralfilosofins grundläggning:The foundation of moral philosophy, p. 25. 3 Cf. Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 42-48. 4 Hägerström, “Hägerström.”; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström.”
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