As has been shown in Part II, Hägerström consistently stressed the importance of distinguishing between the ontological and epistemological aspects of a given subject, as any mix-up of these two aspects of object-analysis will run the risk of resulting in arbitrary determinations of both object and the concept and conception thereof.This issue will be addressed in detail in Parts V andVI, which deal with Hägerström’s analyses of law, for one of Hägerström’s main objects of criticism is the traces of natural law (which in part are the results of a confusion of the ontology and epistemology of law) that he considers to be prevalent in the positivistic study of law. Finally, by maintaining an anti-metaphysical philosophy, Hägerström has demonstrated the philosophical possibility (and necessity) of synthetic a posteriori knowledge, while simultaneously demonstrating the philosophical impossibility of a synthetic a priori. He thus forces philosophy, for all practical intents and purposes, to reject the possibility of any future metaphysics.To jurisprudence, this leads to the conclusion that any tenable science of law must reject legal metaphysics in its entirety. (See, e.g., Part V, Chapter VI). p a r t i i i , c h a p t e r 4 240 sammenhang mit dem römischen Sakralrechte (1929), Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung. 51 (1931).
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