to have knowledge of, is the subject itself and its own determinations. (See, e.g., Part V, Chapter I). A further example of the critical role that Hägerström argues that philosophy should adopt in relation to object-related sciences is to be found in his use of:“Quid Saulus inter prophetas?”208 Hägerström uses the adage as a request that philosophy should prove how it could be of use to or for the object-oriented sciences such as botany (1910) and jurisprudence (1935). (See, e.g., PartV, Chapter I).The only answer that he could supply was: By critical analysis of the object-related sciences’ premisses and instruments.209 Only through a critical analysis of its own premisses could science decide whether or not its results were true and valid. Philosophy thus has nothing material to contribute to the sciences, but rather methods for a formal analysis of scientific propositions.In this respect Hägerström is traditional and radical, traditional insofar as he merely continues the role given to philosophy byKant,210 and radical insofar as Hägerström ideas are truly critical, even denying the fundamental premisses of the moral and legal sciences - at least when one considers the indignation that his analysis caused among contemporary legal scholars.211 a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 239 208 Hägerström,“B.o.F.,” p. 39;“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” p.99;“Declaration of Intention,” p. 299. 209 Hägerström, “B. o. F.,” p. 39;“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 99-100;“Declaration of Intention,” pp. 299-300. See also Hägerström, “I moralpsykologiska frågor II,” pp. 98-99. 210 See what Kant had to say about the policing duty that philosophy should have in respect to the doings of the remaining scientific faculties, and how this duty should be executed in Kant,The Conflict of the Faculties: Der Streit der Fakultäten, pp. 21-36, especially 28-29 and 32-35. In Kant’s Conflict of the Faculties one finds a definite break with the Aristotelian view of philosophy, which governed western philosophy up until the 19th Century, namely the view that philosophy was the science of sciences and that it, philosophy, provided the human mind with insight into the most valuable aspects of nature, that is, insights into the axioms of being, and the first and pristine substance.The presented view of philosophy’s task differs quite radically from Kant’s restrictive view, insofar as the latter does not lay down any evaluative aspects on the fundamentals of scientific reasoning and science. 211 See, e.g., Kunkel, review of Hägerström, Axel, Der römische Obligationsbegriff I. (1927), Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung. 49 (1929); Kübler, review of Hägerström, Axel, Das magistratische Ius in seinem Zu-
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