ström’s epistemology where the fundamental laws of thought are used to reduce the area of the cognizable to those facts, things, and concepts that refer directly to what can be perceived either directly or realized as a non-contradictory entity, namely physical reality - thus removing “das Ding an sich” and other metaphysical concepts from the class of possible and cognizable objects. Hägerström’s removal of the metaphysical from the cognizable forces him to adopt a program of conceptual analysis in order to realize his motto, as it is only through philosophical analysis that sham or illusory concepts (Swedish:“skenbegrepp”) used in science can be exposed for what they really are - that is, illogical and hence false.203 The overriding purpose of Hägerström’s critique of metaphysical elements of philosophy is to safeguard the validity of science and scientific argument by weeding out untenable illusory concepts from the scientific apparatus. In order to achieve this goal the philosopher must act destructively, revealing and dismantling every concept that do not pass scientific standards. It is here that metaphysics, despite its own assurances, errs. It lacks a parsimonious principle of scientific demonstration allowing it to subject its own dogmatic premisses to scientific critique.204 Hence, metaphysics fails to make the crucial distinction between, on the one hand, authoritative and systematic arguments, and on the other, factual arguments, thus erring by treating the two categories of arguments as if they were equal and referred to objective reality in the same manner. For in reality, the authoritative arguments of metaphysics are only valid provided that they are supported by facts, and only systematic arguments can be used to classify and order facts in accordance with the properties and characteristics of the facts themselves. By not observing this fact, the metaphysicians ran the risk of committing what Immanuel p a r t i i i , c h a p t e r 4 236 203 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” p. 99; “Declaration of Intention,” p. 299. C. D. Broad’s translation of “skenbegrepp” is, “notions only in appearance”, which lacks the punch of a direct translation such as “sham concept” or “illusory concept”. 204 Cf. Kant’s preface to the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason.
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