that his definition of knowledge must also correspond to the fundamental laws of thought. If this is the case, then the logical definition of knowledge is: “a non-contradictory apprehension of something as real or as determinate.”197 What, furthermore, strengthens the argument is that this specific definition of knowledge also brings the laws of contradictions, identity, and excluded middle into one single, unitary epistemological context.All in all, a simple application of the laws of thought proves the point. It is only when an apprehension of a self-identical object is free from contradictions that validly we can claim to have real knowledge of something. However, if the apprehension of an object is contradictory, or if the object itself is non-identical, then we have no knowledge.There is no third way. According to Hägerström, every judgment assumes the reality of that judgment’s object.Accordingly, one can never imagine any object as real if it is not self-identical or determinate.198 This is a critical point in his epistemology. Any judgment lacking a selfidentical object also lacks the necessary conditions both for its conceivability and verification.199 Since valid knowledge by definition cannot possibly refer to self-contradictory objects or contain self-contradictory thoughts, then any judgment concerning a self-contradictory concept is impossible to conceive inone coherent thought without resorting to the logically self-defeating use of contradictions.This theory about the congruent nature of knowledge is analogous to Hägerström’s own ontology, which construes reality as being an excluding, single, and coherent unity.200 This is an idea that connects to Hägerström’s logical bap a r t i i i , c h a p t e r 4 234 197 Hägerström, “Hägerström,” p. 90; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström,” p. 315. 198 Hägerström, “Hägerström,”; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström.” 199 Cf. Hägerström,“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 99-100;“Declaration of Intention,” pp. 299-300. 200 Petersson, Värdeteori, pp. 18-25; Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 19-21. 4 . 4 the nature of judgments and propos i t ions
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