One of the main objectives of Hägerström’s philosophy was to disprove Kant’s idea that empirical knowledge hadlogical formand illogical matter, which Hägerström considered that he had done by demonstrating the completely logical character of empirical reality.190 In order to disprove Kant’s ideas, Hägerström was forced to part from his idealistic Kantian roots, and rid his philosophy from all remnants of the idealistic influences that had previously governed it.191 However, his rejection of idealism did not entail his simultaneous abandonment of the Kantian quest for scientific purity. On the contrary, his rejection of idealism actually seems to have strengthened him in his puristic resolve.192 According to Hägerström, the factual circumstance pertaining to the empirical diversity in physical reality does not imply a certain object’s logical exclusion from reality on behalf of another object’s reality.The reality of A does not exclude non-A’s, and a concept’s reality does not exclude the reality of its own extension.193To Hägerström, the reality or determinateness, for examp a r t i i i , c h a p t e r 4 232 4 . 3 e p i stemology vs. ontology - the corre spondence theory of truth “Man hat auch, namentlich in der neuren Erkenntnistheorie, versucht, das Urteil als Vorstellung von demWerte einer gewissenAuffassungsart zu bestimmen.Hierbei wird aber natürlich vorausgesetzt, daß man sich den betreffendenWert selbst als realiter vorhanden vorstellt. Außerdem wird vorausgesetzt, daß man sich bewußte Wesen denkt, für die derWert zu gelten hätte.Und von derWirklichkeit dieserWesen kann man nicht ohne einen Circulus annehmen, sie bedeute, daß es vonWert sei, sei aufzufassen.” Ibid., p. 8. As far as Hägerström is concerned, a concept’s theoretical meaning and practical consequences fall under two different discourses.Theoretical meaning is a scientific question, a question of truth and reality. Practical consequences tell us whether or not this concept is of any use or utility for practical purposes. 190 Ibid., pp. 5-6. See above. 191 Ibid., pp. 1-5. 192 Ibid. Here Hägerström describes his quest for epistemological security, in which he starts off as being governed by dubious authorities (e.g. Kant) who lead him into an epistemological quagmire from which he manages to escape by defining objectivity on the object’s condition instead of the subject’s faculties. Cf., e.g., Sundberg,“Rättskällorna på 1900-talet,” inFilosofi och rättsvetenskap, p. 201.Sundberg pejoratively characterizes the status of contemporary (1970:s) jurisprudential doctrine as an effect of “den hägerströmska vetenskapspurismen” (“the Hägerströmian purism of science”). 193 Cf. Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 17-18.
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