tionships towards one another. It is therefore important to keep this definite relationship in mind when reading Hägerström. For it is only a thorough analysis of the postulated non-contradictory relationship between epistemology, logic, and ontology that will explain Hägerström’s general anti-metaphysical theory as well as the conclusions that he reached in his analyses of moral and legal philosophy (thereby ultimately indicating his methodological view of jurisprudence). Furthermore, unless a proper account is taken of this purely philosophical aspect of his ideas, his subsequent development towards a realistic legal theory is quite impossible to explain or understand, as well as what properly should be understood by the terms “real” and “realistic”. The recurring logical, ontological, and epistemological principle of Hägerström’s philosophy is the principle of identity.184 (NB. In the formal analyses conducted by him in Till analysen af det empiriska själfmedvetandet, he makes use of the principle of identity without references to the law of contradictions, while in his later works he draws a distinction between the principle of identity and the law of contradictions whenever he applies these principles as analytical tools).185 It is thus possible that Hägerström applies a distinction between the two principles (supra) in order to avoid the (metaphysical) error of confusing epistemology for ontology, and vice versa.The theoretical value of maintaining a distinction between these principles is that it allows each of them to be used supremely within the philosophical realms of epistemology and ontology respectively, which is a distinction that thereby helps to uphold other philosophically vital distinctions, a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 229 184 See, e.g., ibid. Here Hägerström discusses the law of contradictions (which is derived from the principle of identity) and states that it was originally understood merely in the form of a law of thought (“Gesetz für das Denken”) but that (according to him) it concerns the essence of reality (Wirklichkeit):“Er [i.e. die Satze derWiderspurchs] sagt inWahrheit aus, was die Wirklichkeit an sich ist [d.h. widerspruchslos] - infolgedessen nicht, was wirklich ist.” (p. 10). It is, according to Hägerström, thus not possible to determine what is real (objectively real [existent] or just real) merely on the basis of the law of contradictions because this law only provides us with the formal definition of reality but not with the material content of reality. 185 See, e.g., ibid.
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