property making their correspondence possible. Since idealistic subjectivism maintains that the subject itself is absolute, then the subject can only correspond to an equally absolute object. Furthermore, if the object of the judgment is relative, then a judgment is only possible to verify if the subject is accordingly relative. However, since idealistic subjectivism denies the relativity of the subject, then the object of the judgment must be absolute. A (scientific) judgment must thus have an absolute object as its object, as this is the only manner allowing the correspondence theory of truth to be applicable to judgments referring to an absolute subject. Hence, idealistic subjectivism makes both the subject and object of judgment absolute categories. In the extension of the metaphysical argument, the aim of the “true” judgment is therefore to investigate absolute objects, which by the way are the only objects that can correspond to an absolute subject. From the metaphysical point of view, any other constellation of absolutivity and relativity between a subject and an object only establishes contingent truths, truths that are true by virtue of the mere coincidence that the absolute subject and the relative object happen to share conceptual properties, but never establish any necessary truths. According to Hägerström’s analysis, the entire metaphysical system of philosophy traces its roots, on the one hand, to the characteristics of the empirical self-consciousness,166 and on the other, to the idea that there exists an absolutely abstract determination.167 The untenability of the idealistic standpoint has already been discussed at length, but the untenability of metaphysical realism must be described in a few words. In order for consciousness to be able to reflect, it must quite naturally have the ability to perform abstractions.As a matter of epistemic as well as psychological necessity, a judgment always contains abstractions of the specific elements that the judgment p a r t i i i , c h a p t e r 3 224 166 Hägerström, Till analysen, pp. 78-79. 167 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 26-34.
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