RB 65

the subject) is merely relative in comparison to the absolute subject.163 Hägerström found the subjectivistic interpretation of the “self ” to be unreasonable, as inter alia it entails that objects have a lesser epistemological importance than subjects, which implies that subjectivism involves an epistemological stratification that makes the standard of objective knowledge subjective rather than objective. The idealistic misconstruction of reality, namely the idea that the “self ” is absolute and everything else relative, gives rise to the invalid assertion that it is possible to assume that there actually does exist an absolute “self ” (which is the eternally recurring subject), which in turn implies that there must exist at least one absolute thing, an eternally recurring object, to which the absolute subject corresponds - in other words a metaphysical application of the correspondence theory of truth combined with the idea of ratio sufficiens the supposition that there exists a specific object whose existence objectively explains our ideas of that object. However, if this idea is analyzed, then it becomes evident that it is only from the subjective point of view that the idea of an absolute “self ” can be maintained, because from any other standpoint (objective or intersubjective) the specific “self ” cannot be absolute.On the contrary, the so-called absolute “self ” is relative to the object of the judgment. It is obvious that the idea that there exists one specific object for every judgment - the thing of things - must have its foundation in the subjectivistic confusion of ontology for epistemology, a confusion of which metaphysical philosophy is repeatedly guilty. Time and again, things are confused for methods, and methods for things. If instead of perceiving the object as a universal category, the all-encompassing qualified object of a judgment, the object is p a r t i i i , c h a p t e r 3 222 3. 5 metaphys ical consequence s connected to the idea of an absolute “se lf ” or subj ect 163 Ibid., pp. 55-60.

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