subject and predicate should be distinguished here as well as in other instances.The problems connected to the existence-judgment have their roots in the fact that its predicate, existence itself, is the real connection between the grammatical predicate and the grammatical subject, the latter being that specific object predicated to have existence.157 It is perhaps easier to understand the nature of existence in a judgment if one keeps in mind exactly what Hägerström meant by the concept of judgment: A judgment predicates that there exists an objective causal relationship connecting the elements of the judgment.The judgment predicates the necessity of certain things (necessity being a logical category, not a physical category); and a judgment predicates the objective (logic) existence (validity) of something as real.158The problem is that a judgment always has the “self ” or subject as a tacitly recurring factor in the judgment-form, for whenever a judgment is passed, the “self ” invariably turns out to be an element of the judgment, while the other element is the object of the judgment. If the object is compared with the “self ”, then it will appear to be relative or subject to continuous change, while on the other hand the “self ” appears absolute and universal in a manner that the object lacks. Hence, it is the fact that the subject’s “self ” (or the unity of consciousness) is always the same in any judgment expressed by a specific subject, while the objects of a judgment fluctuate, from a subjective point of view expressing an “objective” state of affairs, which in turn impresses upon consciousness the idea that it is the “self ” that is absolute while everything else is relative. Methodologically, Hägerström’s use of the physical object or object matter of a judgment as its standard of validity means that p a r t i i i , c h a p t e r 3 220 157 Ibid., p. 63. See also Simmonds, “The Legal Philosophy of Axel Hägerström,”The Juridical Review88 (1976): p. 212. Here N. E. Simmonds discusses Hägerström’s analysis of the ontological “is”, which is said to have a function in a judgment as that of a logical copula rather than as a descriptive assertion.The being is not a property of a thing, it is, on the contrary, merely a connection between things and hence also concepts. 158 Hägerström, Till analysen, pp. 58 and 60-66.
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