nected to one another in a necessary manner.151The latter is a necessity for the judgment itself, because if it fails to postulate the necessity of this causal relationship, then it lacks the objective characteristics distinguishing it from other mental acts, as for example, the epistemologically inferior apprehension (see above). Furthermore, the context in which the elements relate to one another is only possible to determine by means of a judgment, as it is only the judgment that predicates whether or not the elements of the aforementioned context are causally connected. In fact, Hägerström argues, it is impossible to express a causal relationship in any other form of mental act other than by judgment.152 A judgment comes into existence whenever a certain state of affairs is predicated as being objectively real,153 or when the mind reflects over the connection between the different elements inherent in the judgment, for instance, in the grammatical form of subject - predicate,154 which requires the supposition of a causal relationship between the elements of the judgment (as the judgment, according to Hägerström, constitutes the apprehension of an objectively causal relationship between different elements).155 The causal connection between the different elements of a judgment, however, is not a figment of the imagination, but mere perceptions of the factual relationships between several elements.156 The existence-judgment (Swedish: existentialomdömet) is a type of judgment with problems of its own. Nevertheless, it should be treated as every other type of judgment, and quite naturally a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 219 151 Ibid., p. 41. 152 Cf. ibid., pp. 41 and 60-66. Cf. Hägerström, “Hägerström.”; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström.” 153 Hägerström, Till analysen, p. 61. 154 Ibid., p. 62. 155 See 3.3.3, above. 156 Hägerström, Till analysen, pp. 61-62. 3. 3. 4 the exi stence- judgment - metaphys ical connotat ions
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