self-identical reality for which the theory of reality’s own necessary self-identity was held to be true and valid. As indicated earlier, the ontological principles in Till analysen af det empiriska själfmedvetandet are intended to refute idealistic epistemology.To begin, it is the selfbeing (Swedish: själfvarat) of an object, but not the I-character (Swedish: jagkaraktären) of an object, that can be predicated of every conceivable thing, while according to idealism it is the I-character that is predicated in general, but not a specific thing’s selfbeing.128 As a matter of economy, Hägerström’s theory makes the subjective standpoint ontologically redundant as Hägerström’s theory only makes the“self ” or consciousness a necessary determinant for the selfbeing of one object, namely that of the “self ” or consciousness itself. All other objects are selfbeing by virtue of themselves and their own existence, and are independent of whether or not the predicates “self ” andconsciousness are attributable to them.129 However,Hägerström’s dismissal of consciousness’ or Self’s ontological importance does not totally deprive consciousness of its epistemological importance; on the contrary, consciousness constitutes a necessary factor in knowledge, but it is not the sole necessary factor in knowledge.130 Furthermore, a total dismissal of the role of consciousness in the production of knowledge would lead to the absurd notion that knowledge would be possible even without a perceiving subject.131 The ontological concept of selfbeing constitutes an expression of the logical principle of identity.132 Selfbeing is the very principle p a r t i i i , c h a p t e r 3 210 3. 2 ontolog ical princi ple s 128 Hägerström, Till analysen, p. 21. 129 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 130 Cf. ibid., p. 55. 131 Hägerström, “Ett Hägerström brev,” pp. 89-90. 132 Hägerström, Till analysen, pp. 21-22. 3. 2 . 1 se lfbe ing
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