Logren’s characteristic of Hägerström as a practical nihilist contradicts the core of his entire philosophy, both from practical and theoretical perspectives.122 Logren’s conclusion rests on the premiss that a certain practical and prescriptive system of ethics or morals, in this case “practical nihilism”, can be deduced from a theoretical conclusion or a specific scientific truth, which is a method of demonstration that Hägerström’s philosophy denies (at least if the practical conclusions claim to establish normative truths). On the contrary (as demonstrated, in Part IV), truth and morals are separate categories in both Hägerström’s ontology and epistemology of values. His theory of value, ontology, and epistemology only allows the conclusion that judgments and conclusions based upon scientific truths are be used to support, prove, or disprove other scientific arguments and judgments, but not to be used in a similar manner when dealing with moral or other normative arguments. A fact that is often overlooked is that Hägerström’s analysis of values discusses two parallel discourses, one normative and the other scientific, and accordingly scientific judgments and propositions can only be used to support, prove, or disprove scientific propositions - that is, those propositions that have a discernable truth value. However, scientific propositions cannot be applied in the same manner with respect to non-scientific arguments, which by definition lack a discernable truth value and non-subjective standard of verification. a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 207 122 This misinterpretation of the normative content, as well as other aspects, of Hägerström’s philosophy seems to have been widespread among his contemporaries.About the reception of Hägerström’s moral theory, see, e.g., Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, pp. 195-208 (About John Landquist,AllenVannérus, Svante Bohman, Fredrik Böök, and Albert Nilsson); Nordin, Hägerström till Hedenius, p. 27; Källström, Den gode nihilisten:Axel Hägerström och striderna kring uppsalafilosofin, pp.95-102; Strömberg, “Är uppsalafilosfin död?,”Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap (TfR) 99 (1986): p. 210; Mautner, Vägledning till Hägerströmstudiet, pp. 7-8.Among contemporary writers such misunderstandings of Hägerström’s theories still surface, cf., e.g., Bjarup,“Axel Hägerströms filosofi, värdenihilism och rättspositivism,” pp. 29-33 and40-41; Peczenik, Vad är rätt? Om demokrati, rättssäkerhet, etik och juridisk argumentation, pp. 394398; Sigurdson, Den lyckliga filosofin: etik och politik hos Hägerström,Tingsten, makarna Myrdal och Hedenius, pp. 74-79; Sundberg, fr. Eddan t. Ekelöf: repetitorium om rättskällor i Norden, pp. 192-193 and 264-271; The Swedish Philosopher Axel Haegerstroem and his Relationship to Finland’s Struggle to Preserve her Legal Order, 1899-1917, passim.
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