two, entailing one system of philosophical truths and one system of empirical truths running alongside each other, but not necessarily corresponding to one another.The existence of such scientific parallelism in turn implies that the theory of correspondence must be rejected as a truth criterion.The lack of points of correspondence between the two systems therefore entails that, in reality, they can be used neither to verify nor refute one another’s propositions. Any determination of correspondence between the parallel systems will thus have to be left to a method based upon an arbitrary (subjective) determination of correspondence, rather than on a method based upon a factual (objective) correspondence,whereby any scientific claims of verification must become seriously undermined. If the former is the case, then this must entail that truth itself is a subjective or contingent category of science, rather than being an objective category of science. In addition, if the two systems are reciprocal and correspond to one another, which they must do if the principle of identity is valid for both systems at the same time (the principle of scientific monism), then the method for the determination of correspondence between the systems and verifying instances must follow another path than that of the subjective and arbitrary methods provided by idealism. In order for the verification of any philosophical proposition by empirical data and factors to be possible, it must be possible to set the philosophical proposition in correspondence with reality in a certain determinate manner. On the other hand, in order to be verifiable, an empirical proposition finds its verification in its certain and determinate corrrespondence to the principles of philosophy, as determined by the nature of human thought, rather than the dogmas of empiricism. This in turn indicates the dualism of knowledge in subjectivism. a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 205
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