nate (real), but this neither means that the geometrical concepts themselves have independent existence nor that there exist any physical circles or any other geometrical figures that comply exactly with the formal definitions of the geometrical concepts. Nevertheless, at the same time, it is definitely true that the geometrical concepts are to be found among or in physical figures. This does not imply that geometrical concepts per se are unreal, but merely that they have no existence of themselves.What they do posses is indirect existence, indirect objective reality, which is negotiated by means of the thoughts inherent in the physically existent, objectively real subjects.91 The ideal conceptual circle and the physical circles do in fact resemble each other. But who made whom?The problem is one of priority.Are concepts prior to objects, or are objects prior to concepts? In connection with the preceding analysis of Hägerström’s conceptual theory, it must be remarked that several authors have contended that Hägerström’s theory of concepts is realistic in the metaphysical meaning of the word.92 See, for instance, the conceptual theory presented by Hägerström in “Botanisten och filosofen”, according to which the process of conceptual determination strives at literally merging the concept with its corresponding object.93 However compelling this line of argument might appear to be, it fails to take into consideration that in order for Hägerström’s theory of concepts to be realistic in the metaphysical meaning of the word, then Hägerström would have to subscribe to a transcendent philosophy, as such a philosophy is the conditio sine qua non for the possibility of reificated concepts. However, from1908 onwards, his philosophy is decidedly nona ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 197 91 Cf. Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, pp. 113-120. 92 E.g., Bjarup, Reason, p. 208;“Epistemology and Law according to Axel Hägerström,” pp. 26-32; “Axel Hägerströms filosofi, värdenihilism och rättspositivism,” pp. 27, see however 31. Cf. Bjarup, “Reality and Ought: Hägerström’s Inaugural Lecture Reexamined,” in Justice, Morality and Society: a Tribute to Aleksander Peczenik on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday 16 November 1997, pp. 87-91; Silverbark, Fysikens filosofi, pp. 123-131. 93 Hägerström, “B. o. F.,” pp. 78-95, especially pp. 81-83.
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