ality of the object on account of its determinateness as a specific that.The second supporting principle is the non-contradictoriness of reality, which is the basis to the general causality between objects in physical reality and time, which in turn makes it possible for empirical science to distinguish between subjective and objective reality.59 A comparison shows that these supports have the self-identity of reality as a common denominator, which is neither an attribute nor quality discoverable in addition to other attributes or qualities of reality, nor discoverable by means of an analysis of reality itself. In fact, self-identity is intrinsic to the very concept of reality itself. Moreover, the connection between the two concepts also allows the conclusion that whatever is self-identical, non-contradictory is also real.60 In conclusion, empirical sciences base their validity upon facts and reality’s identity with itself,61 with indications of traces of what strictly speaking is rationalism in Hägerström’s philosophy - namely, its reliance on a logical principle. However, in other respects Hägerström distances himself from pure subjectivism and starts to approach an objectivistic, or at least an empirical, standpoint.62 It is, therefore, perhaps safe to argue that a break between the ontological ideas of Das Prinzip derWissenschaft and those of Selbstdarstellungen had already taken place as early as “Botanisten och filosofen” (1910).63 In “Botanisten och filosofen”, Hägerström presents a theory of universals that, so to speak, allows the concepts to oscillate between two force fields constituted, on the one hand, by the logia ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 187 59 Ibid., p. 106. 60 This means that Hägerström has redefined his position of the relationship between reality and self-identity.They cannot, as is the case in Das Prinzip derWissenschaft, be one another’s correlates; they have an identical meaning, as one another’s synonyms. 61 Hägerström, “B. o. F.,” pp. 106-107. 62 As shown by the collapse of the Philosopher’s first, subjectivistic standpoint 63 The 1910 edition of “Botanisten och filosofen” does not contradict this conclusion, since there are no fundamental differences in this aspect between the two editions of the text. 2 . 4 a theory of unive r sals
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=