The arguments against Hägerström’s presentation of his philosophy (from1908onwards) as a single and coherent entity are generally centered on the observation that his ideas presented of 1908 contain elements that he later, especially in Selbstdarstellungen (1929), characterized as metaphysical.14 Professor Konrad Marc-Wogau doubted the idea that Hägerström’s philosophy underwent little or no development during the aforementioned period.According to him, there exists a clear difference between the ideas expressed inDas Prinzip derWissenschaft and those expressed in Selbstdarstellungen, especially since the terminology of Das Prinzip derWissenschaft appears to express fundamentally metaphysical ideas that Hägerström in 1929 rejected as metaphysical.15 It is not only with respect to a concept’s logical and ontological status that the ideas expressed in Das Prinzip derWissenschaft appear to be metaphysical when compared with Hägerström’s use of the term “metaphysical” in Selbstdarstellungen.16 (See part II). Hägerström’s use of the term “consciousness” inDas Prinzip derWissenschaft indicates that the consciousness, the subject, and the object are held to be related to one another in a manner necessitating the conclusion that the subject and the object must be a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 173 1. 1 the ident i ty betwe en obj ect and subj ect in Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft 13 E.g., Oxenstierna, Vad är Uppsalafilosofien?, passim; Cassirer, Hägerström, pp. 39-40; Hedenius, “Om Hägerströms filosofi.”; Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, pp. 53-82;Wedberg, Historia 3, pp. 366-377., Nordin, Hägerström till Hedenius, pp. 32-52. 14 Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, pp. 62-64 and 80-81; Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, pp. 198 and 508-528; Nordin, Hägerström till Hedenius, pp. 37-52. 15 Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, pp. 53-55. 16 Martin Fries refers to Hägerström’s theory of reality in “Botanisten och filosofen”, and consequently that the one in Das Prinzip derWissenschaft equates reality and existence and furthermore sees the two concepts as one another’s correlates.A theory that Hägerström abandons in Selbstdarstellungen, but this abandonment is merely a restatement of the former theory that does not entail a fundamental change of his philosophy, merely elucidates it, for according to Martin Fries it is impossible to understand Hägerström’s latter philosophy if his “elucidation” involved any fundamental changes. Martin Fries, in Hägerström, “B. o. F.,” pp. 107, n see 253-254.
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