minateness, and that knowledge is correspondingly devoid of contradictions. In the correspondence theory a true proposition entails that the only possible relationship between mind and matter is one where they correspond to one another.382 Because Hägerström himself embraced a correspondence theory of truth,383 his philosophy in general can only be understood in such a context (which includes his ontology).His correspondence theory of truth can serve as an explanation as to why he has been understood to represent either, or both, metaphysical materialism and conceptual realism.384 Such interpretations of Hägerström easily come to mind if one does not bear in mind that the correspondence theory of truth does not need to be of a metaphysical nature. The correspondence between mind and matter in a true judgment does not per se refer to an essential identity between concepts and things. Correspondence between mind and matter could actually, as is the case with Hägerström’s theory, predicate the proposed existence of a logically valid relationship between subjective form and objective content, whereby both subject and object express a point of reference and comparison, which may or may not correspond to one another. According to Jes Bjarup, Markku Helin, and Thord Silverbark, Hägerström’s philosophy is either, or both, epistemological realism and rationalism, as well as being ontological realism and rationalism.385 However, such analyses are hard to defend if one bears in mind that Hägerström’s epistemology does not leave open any a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 163 382 Ibid. 383 Petersson, Värdeteori, pp. 50-51. 384 See Bjarup, Reason, passim; Helin, Lainoppi ja metafysiikka: tutkimus skandinaavisen oikeusrealismin tieteenkuvasta ja sen vaikutuksesta Suomen siviilioikeuden tutkimuksessa vuosina 1920-1960(Legal dogmatics and metaphysics.A study on the conception of science of Scandinavian Legal Realism and its effects on Finnish civil law research in 1920-1960), p. 432; Silverbark, Fysikens filosofi, pp. 128-129 and 392. 385 See Bjarup, Reason, passim; Helin, Lainoppi, p. 432; Silverbark, Fysikens filosofi, p. 392. 7. 3. 1 alte rnat ive inte rpretat ions of häge r ström’s phi losophy
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