Despite the historical opposition between idealism and realism, Hägerström argues that they are philosophical twins making up the basic forms of metaphysics.345 Epistemological idealism regards consciousness as being the ultimate ground of knowledge.346 Epistemological realism regards a supernatural reality, that is, the thing in itself, as the ultimate ground of knowledge, because realism is based upon the assumption that there is something beyond that which we have knowledge about, something that can only be determined as being something abstract.347 Idealism and realism deal with the ultimate ground of knowledge from opposite perspectives, but show considerable similarities and point in the same direction with respect to the nature of knowledge.To start with, neither of them provide any firm basis when determining whether or not our ideas about reality have any veracity at all.The subjectivistic criteria for truth that are supposed to be self-evident (in that they do not need to rely on sensory data for their verification) turn out to be covertly dependent upon the cognition of an object for their verification. Apart from this innate contradiction, there exists a link between consciousness and objects.348 On the other hand, the truth criterion of epistemological realism is the thing in itself, as epistemological realism holds neither perceptions or awareness of an object alone as being sufficient conditions for the determination of an object’s reality, nor for the definition of the thing in itself. According to the realistic view, reality as such is invariably beyond p a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 6 152 schauung kann nur durch das Denken gesetzt werden. Daher ist das Denken selbst die Realität. Hiergegen der Empirismus: Nieder mit den leeren Abstraktionen. Der Sinn allein gibt der Erkenntnis Inhalt. In dem Sinn allein ist die Wirklichkeit gegeben.”344 344 Hägerström, P. d.W., p. 17. NB. According to Martin Fries “Empirismus” and “Realismus” are one another’s synonyms in Hägerström’s philosophy. See, Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, p. 55. 345 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 20-21 and 33-34; Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, p. 55. 346 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 5-6. 347 Ibid., pp. 5-6, 20-21, 26-27, and 33-34. 348 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
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