realism, the subject never has access to the universal since it is immanent in things in a manner that cannot ever be properly unveiled or perceived by the subject.326 Finally, in nominalism, the universals are just arbitrarily chosen words signifying things and the state of things.327 In neither idealism, realism, nor nominalism will the analysis of a universal provide the material needed to analytically determine and conclude whether or not a universal or concept is real. A characteristic of the theories is that they either, or both, determine the reality of a concept by reference to superior concepts and refrain from determining the criteria for a concept’s validity. According to Hägerström (post Prinzip derWissenschaft), the only feasible method of determining a concept’s reality is by means of conceptual analysis, which reveals the component parts of the concept - those parts that are objective, and those that are subjective. This entails that conceptual analysis, in order to conclude whether or not a concept is real, helps to determine when subjective distinctions are in correspondence with objective qualities. Hägerström’s rejection of sensualism (sensationalism), which he calls a debaser of science,328 helps us understand why the purely “objective”standpoint, which contrary to scholastic realism lacks essential assumptions, cannot make up a firm foundation for the construction of universals or concepts.329 The sensualistic standpoint fails to explain howand why we have concepts.According to sensualism, all perceptions are epistemologically equal, and perceptions per se do not express any unity going beyond themselves.The only unity that perceptions express is that they themselves belong to the conceptual class of perceptions. Consequently, a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 147 326 A Companion to Metaphysics, Kim and Sosa, eds., Realism;A Companion to Epistemology, Dancy and Sosa, eds., Realism. See also Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet, pp. 230-232. Cf. Hägerström, “Relativitetsteori och kunskapsfilosofi,” p. 196. 327 A Companion to Metaphysics, Kim and Sosa, eds., Nominalism. Cf. Hägerström,“Relativitetsteori och kunskapsfilosofi,” pp. 229-230. 328 Hägerström, “Relativitetsteori och kunskapsfilosofi,” pp. 229-230. 329 Hägerström, P. d.W., p. 10.
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