does not mean that they are real in the sense that they exist independently of the epistemological subjects or that the concepts have any references in the physical world, as is the case for geometrical concepts, which are logically consistent, but which lack direct counterparts in physical reality.312 In such a case is it possible to formulate valid synthetic concepts on the basis of induction? Yes, it must be, because to Hägerström induction itself only constitutes a non-deductive method of inference, helping to establish valid synthetic concepts.Hence, the concept of validity, with regard to metaphysical philosophy, has been redefined as signifying validity with reference to specific empirical material, validity a posteriori. If one on the other hand held that it was possible to establish valid synthetic concepts a priori this would, according to Hägerström’s analysis, entail epistemological nihilism, as the a priori part of the synthetic concept entailed that the concept held apodictically, whereby the synthetic concept would have to be independent of any particulars creating it.The fact that induction is used to infer general laws from the observation of particular instances indicates that synthetic concepts too are formulated on the basis of inductive processes and that the formulation of synthetic concepts consequently must follow the rules that generally apply to induction.313 p a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 4 140 312 Cf. Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 5-9. 313 Cf. Hägerström, “B. o. F.,” pp. 30-43 and 78-110; “Relativitetsteori och kunskapsfilosofi,” pp. 203-207.
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