such claims to the effect that inductive knowledge could have any such qualities are in fact conceptually illogical and point to an inherent confusion of ideas that undermines the tenability of the knowledge thus established. In addition to the fact that induction is not, and cannot be, transcendental it can neither establish absolute synthetic concepts nor equally establish knowledge, statement D.310 This is because it would entail that the absolute concepts and the absolute knowledge one believed to have established would be absolute on the condition that the laws of logic were abolished in order to allow the Absolute to be derived from the Relative. Based upon these premisses we can draw the conclusion that Hägerström’s view is one in which induction generally should be understood to be of the enumerative kind, and thus only establishing statistical or relative truths, not a kind of induction stating absolute truths and absolute concepts. Furthermore, it is important to distinguish induction as an epistemological method from the formulation of concepts, as these two concepts are not synonymous with one another. Induction, according to Hägerström, will only lay down regularities, but neither determine nor find the objective forces behind an event.311 In addition, a concept may be validly formulated without any reference to empirical reality.The creation of such concepts in this manner could, according to Hägerström, mean that the concepts are real in the sense that they are non-contradictory, but it a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 139 4 . 2 . 7 d. the re exi st ne i the r absolute conce pts nor absolute knowledge 4 . 2 . 8 summary 310 Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. 48, 82, 144-146, and235; Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 23-24 and 26;“Gällande rätt,” pp. 63-64, 66, and70-73;“‘Ein Stein ...’”;“Om pliktmedvetandet,” pp. 79-80 and 86-87;“Ett Hägerström brev,” pp. 88-89;“Filosofien som vetenskap,” p. 12. 311 Hägerström, “Kraftvorstellungen,” pp. 71-72.
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