predict future events, while the uselessness of metaphysical subjectivism and solipsism is repeatedly demonstrated by its inability to help predict future events.306 Hägerström continues and places the use of induction in a greater context by setting it in relation to other empirical facts and inferences. For instance, if a single act or group of perceptions or inductions contradict a greater body of perceptions and inductive inferences, or established laws of nature, then the contradicting mental acts must be dismissed as tools to determine physical reality.This is, for instance, how one deals with hallucinations and other mis-perceptions.This, the contextual use of perceptions and inductions opens up for the realization that empirical knowledge always is, and must be, relative.All that can be established by means of empirical knowledge is thus probabilities, truths can be refuted by other observations.307 Since induction is only empirical to its nature and relative to its reach, it cannot establish transcendent knowledge in any form, nor have any necessary bearing on discourses external to the investigated material.308 Thus: Induction is neither other-worldly nor transcendental in any other aspect. Induction cannot establish knowledge of a non-existent inner core of reality, for that would necessitate that the reach of the inductive inference itself would have to be extended to include a discourse external to the investigated material.309 Consequently, one must also refrain from extending the reach of the inductive inference from also encompassing analytic truths, absolutely and necessary truths, besides empirical truths, and relatively and statistically certain truths.Any p a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 4 138 4 . 2 . 6 c. induct ion i s ne i the r othe r-worldly nor transcendental 306 Hägerström, “Ett Hägerström brev,” p. 88. 307 Ibid.: pp. 88-89. 308 Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. 18-19, 82, 145-146, 232-234, and 237-238; Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 23-25; “Gällande rätt,” p. 66; “‘Ein Stein ...’”; “Om pliktmedvetandet,” pp. 79-80 and 86-87; “Ett Hägerström brev,” pp. 88-89; “Relativitetsteori och kunskapsfilosofi,” pp. 196, 206-211, and 224-230; “Filosofien som vetenskap,” p. 12. 309 Cf., e.g., Hägerström, “Filosofien som vetenskap,” p. 12.
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