terial. On the contrary, this fact is a conclusion drawn from the reflection that further observations of facts may give other results. In other words, if the inductive inference is set within a greater context, then the inductive context may either become verified or falsified, depending on whether or not the greater context contains supporting evidence.297 Methodologically it is only through a wide range of exact observations that the tenability of inductive inferences is supported.298 In turn, this entails that the tenability and certainty of inductive inferences necessarily must remain statistically rather than deductively determinable, for the perceptions and inductions drawn from the former are themselves set in relation to a predetermined objective world, which itself is governed by causality.299 All in all, the exactness of the observations necessitate the supposition that certain causal rules exist, for it is only through the existence of such causal rules that it becomes possible to determine whether or not an object constitutes an objective element of the empirical world causing a perception,300 because induction itself includes the underlying supposition that the course of events has regularity.301 It is thus by means of inductions supported by the (presupposed) causal rules and causal connections of reality that we decide objectivity, for:“Die angenommen Kausalregeln bleiben als objektiv bestehen, solange sich neue Fakta in ihrem Rahmen begreifen und auch vorausbestimmen lassen.”302 Hence, the extent to which induction provides knowledge of the external world is limited and relative, especially since neither perceptions nor inductions constitute irrefutable knowledge, for what induction provides is a standard determining whether or not given perceptions provide basis to real, objective knowledge of an object.303 p a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 4 136 297 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 23-24. 298 Ibid., pp. 21-24; Hägerström, “Ett Hägerström brev,” pp. 88-89. 299 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, p. 24. 300 Ibid. 301 Hägerström, “Om pliktmedvetandet,” in Socialfilosofiska uppsatser, p. 86. 302 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, p. 24. 303 Hägerström, “Relativitetsteori och kunskapsfilosofi,” p. 205.
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