denied, then its denial by definition is contradictory and inconsistent.280 However, the transcendent argument is not wholly formal, since in part it does have a material, factual component, and thus it cannot constitute a purely formal argument and it is consequently possible to deny the conclusions following from this non-formal argument on a) material grounds as well as b) on formal grounds.The problem must thus have its roots in the transcendental argument itself, not in the denial of the truth or validity of the transcendent conclusion. What is problematic with the transcendent type of inference is that it does not limit the span of possible conclusions to those that are absolutely necessary, as is done in proper logical argumentation. On the contrary,the transcendental inference opens the field wide open to all kinds of speculation about causes, essential features, and choice of determinations. The reason for this is the transcendental inference’s lack of a logical connection between its empirical material and the intuitive apprehension of the socalled true concept. Since the transcendental argument allows that the objective features, which should determine a concept or formulate a regularity, are placed beyond space and time, the introduction of the transcendent argument annihilates the last vestige of a logical connection between particular and universal instances.Any connection between the two thus becomes arbitrary. It therefore becomes “possible” to “reach” and “establish” “truths” that are in no way logically connected to the specific material of induction, which in turn entails that the inductively based generalization in transcendental argumentation cannot be validly inferred from adduced evidence. The problem is thus whether or not it is possible to establish synthetic knowledgea priori. Is it possible to base empirical knowledge upon formal structure alone or must it be based upon material content? Hägerström is of the opinion that empirical knowledge ultimatelymust be based upon a material, objective content, p a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 4 128 280 Shaw, Logic and its Limits, p. 142.
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