tem of (presupposed real) entities and concepts; it merely points out that singular quality that a concept must have in order to be at all intelligible - namely, determinateness. Because of the demand for intelligibility, the theory must be regarded as being epistemologically rather than ontologically slanted, since the former cannot, while the latter can, dispense with the requirement of intelligibility. Furthermore, the theory of Selbstdarstellungen is mainly concerned with the prerequisites of knowledge proper, rather than with the prerequisites of objects proper.231 It is only the imagined relations of real concepts that can be proved to be either determinate or non-determinate, never the objects themselves; for the objects either exist or do not exist. Objects have the predicate of existence, which implies and includes reality, while reality does not necessarily imply existence.232The theory of Selbstdarstellungen is thus a further example of Hägerström’s philosophical programdemanding aseparation of epistemology from ontology. From an ontological perspective, Hägerström’s theory tells us that it is only determinate, non-contradictory concepts that can constitute real concepts (which does not imply that concepts exist in the objective meaning, independently of the subject thinking it).Any concept that is indeterminate is therefore not a real concept, since unreal concepts are concepts that are contradictory, and are so regardless of the determinateness and reality of their elemental parts.This means that Hägerström’s theory acknowledges that a class of concepts can be subdivided into two different categories: the real and the seemingly real.233 However, this subdivision of concepts does not allow the conclusion that Hägerström’s theory acknowledges the existence of two types of objects: the real and the seemingly real.Things and objects either a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 109 231 According to Hägerström’s philosophy there is not much to be said about objects since they are what they are, viz. self-identical, and nothing more. 232 See also Hägerström, “Hägerström.”; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström.” 233 Cf. Hägerström,“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 99-100;“Declaration of Intention,” pp. 299-300.
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