28 to settle for the “subtraction model” in the works of Pierre de Belleperche and Bartolus, and the later authors Farinacius and Menochius. Thus, the amount of counterevidence was subtracted from the full proof/- This probably meant that a full proof could be shaken rather easily. The lowest category of proof was called indicium (circumstantial evidence). For medieval scholars, indicia were difficult to define. As examples, the following were mentioned - all, again, identifiable in the Finnish nineteenth-century legal practice as well enmity between the deceased and the murderer; the accused being detected at the site of the crime or with a bloody weapon; suspicions against the accused; an accomplice’s statement, and an extra-judicial confession. It is of central importance fromthe point of view of the theory’s logic that the indicia could never be combined with each other for full proof; logically, even less could a condemnation be based on one indicium only. According to some authors (Baldus, Farinacius), indicia together with probatio semiplena could, however, add up to full proof. Depending on the author, indicia were divided differently. The most important divisions were three: close and remote indicia-, indubitable and dubitable indicia-, indicia necessary to condemn, torture, or arrest the suspect, and those needed to commence inquisitory proceedings.^"^ However, the major importance of indicia lay in the fact that they could be conducive to torture {indicia ad torturam)7^ In the logic of ius commune, it was confession that judicial torture strove for.^^ To commence judicial torture, a full certainty of the commission of the crime {corpus delicti) had to be at hand. Not just anybody could be subjugated to torture: serious circumstantial evidence had to exist against the accused, although full proof had not yet been obtained. Furthermore, all other legal means of arriving at full proof had to have been exhausted.In other words, judicial torture was the last resort, ultima ratio. Although examples of evidence sufficient for torture abound in treatise books and certain statutes,in the last instance it was a matter of the judge’s free evaluation to decide whether the circumstantial evidence sufficed to torture the accused or not.^^ In itself, the ordering or execution of torture {quaesLévy 1939 p. 126; Fernandez Espinar 1979 p. 84-85. Fernandez Espinar 1979 pp. 77—78. Fiorelli 1954 II p. 126. The division of evidence intoproxima, remota, and others was familiar to Nehrman as w'ell; see belowChapter 6. For an extensive treatment of the institution of judicial torture from the historical, institutional, political, moral, and judicial points of view', see Fiorelli 1953-1954 I-II. See also Few 1939 pp.127-129. Fiorelli 1954 II pp. 103-104. Ibid. pp. 1-2. Of the early modern statutes, the Halsgerichtordnung of Charles V (Carolina) of 1532 and the Ordinance of Villers-Cotterets of 1539 could be mentioned. See below Chapters 2 and 3. Fiorelli 1954 II p. 163-164.
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