256 were elsewhere, although Finland’s abrupt dissociation from the former mother country in 1809 caused a particularly forceful need to rapidly build up an administrative systemfor the Grand Duchy. These grand lines of the nineteenth-century social and political development can be associated with the emergence of free evaluation of evidence. The latter is a modern discipline, and it belongs together with the birth of the nineteenthcentury bureaucracy. Both free evaluation of evidence and a rational bureaucracy governed by formal-rational laws contributed, as two sides of the same coin, to the efficient functioning of the state apparatus. In the modernizing society which demanded the predictability of legal decisions, legal procedure stumbled into increasing difficulties when trying to cope with the cumbersome system of legal proof that tended to produce haphazard results although its purpose was to produce certainty and safeguard. Furthermore, as has been emphasized above, a close connection between free evaluation of evidence and the classical criminal law is logical to establish. Without the freedomof judgment furnished by the former, the sophisticated categories of guilt provided bv the latter would have been impossible to put into practice. The legal theory of proof withits rigid compartmentalizations can be understood as an allegory of the estate-divided society surrounding it; similarly, free evidence of evaluation portrays the nineteenth-century liberal state, supposedly cleansed of predetermined social divisions and arbitrary boundaries. Just as the statutory theory of proof stems froma decision-maker that passively applies the rules of proof to a case, the idea of free evaluation of evidence takes the Kantian subject, morally free and responsible, as its point of departure. Changes in the “deep justification” of the legal system- - or what could, following the French annalists, also be called a factor of longue durée^ -, produce changes at the level of what has been called “legal form,” i.e., the level of legal theories and statutory law."* The transition from the premodern to modern liberal society was undoubtedly such a slow-changing, deep-structure move. As should be quite obvious now, modern society could not continue with the legal theory of proof any more than it could function without classical criminal law, or the modern theor\^ of contract.^ If this kind of deep-structure changes - See Hänninen (1981) whose social theory has been applied to legal phenomena by Tuori (1990) and Pöyhönen (1988). ^ Braudel 1980 pp. 27-34. ■* The terms “deep justification” and history of “long duration” do not, of course, refer to anv separate entities here and do not imply any division into a deep structure and superstructure in the Marxian sense. Rather, both slowly changing and faster-moving elements are present in the conCrete historical occurrences. In fact, it is through devices such as law of proof or criminal law that large-scale changes are carried out; the lasv of proof, then, is no passive reflection of something happening “below.” What Pöyhönen calls the “will theor\' of contract” of Savigny, based on individual .lutonomy and free will, represents modernity in this respect. On the will theory, see Pöyhönen 1988 pp. 12C138.
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