246 support in what the lawgiver had uttered and [the interpretation] could be logically extracted from [what the lawgiver has uttered].”^* Outrightly, Montgomery expresses his resentment of the objective theory and any possible adaptation of a normto present circumstances: “Any developments of the lawgiver’s ideas that surpass [the lawgiver’s original intent] and do not have a connection to the law’s purpose whatsoever, also lack, however justified they may seem, because they are not included in the lawgiver’s conscious will, the holiness of the law and cannot, therefore, be valid as norms of action on mere interpretative grounds. Around the turn of the century, Ekströmwas also in favor of the subjective theory of interpretation. According to him, a statute has to be interpreted according to what “with certainty can be proved to have been the lawgiver’s meaning.” In turn, the objective interpretation abandons the best instrument that legal interpretation has at its disposal, holding onto mere “dead words” and ignoring the “living idea” behind them. In practice, however, Ekström’s position does not differ significantly from the objective theory. The lawgiver’s purpose cannot always be deciphered; then, the interpreter has to make the best of the letter of the law. Further on, Ekströmlets the reader understand that the lawgiver’s will can also be hypothetical: “the lawgiver’s or the interpreter’s opinion of what [the lawgiver] or several enlightened persons would have meant by the statute had they enacted it - either at the time of its enactment or under present circumstances.”^^ Thus, in spite of his primary adherence to the subjective theory of interpretation, Ekströmallows for important reservations to the theory as compared to the way it was presented by most of his predecessors. The lawgiver’s will can be hypothetical: it can, thus, be construed by the interpreter. And, moreover, Ekströmallows the interpreter to adapt his interpretation to present circumstances; this was, in fact, one of the basic ideas of the objective theory. And besides, in the absence of the lawgiver’s original motivations, the interpreting judge was allowed to formulate his interpretation according to the statute’s wording. At the time when Ekström held his lectures, it is understandable that he had to give up the original requisite of the subjective theory, for the process of legislation was growing increasingly complex: it was often difficult to ascertain and to locate the lawgiver’s will. Even before Ekströmtaught his theories to the law students of the Imperial Alexander University in Helsinki, R. A. Wrede had introduced the objective “[SJäkert stöd uti hvad lagstiftaren uttalat och derur logiskt låta härleda sig.” Ibid. pp. 98-99. “Den utveckling af lagstiftarens tanke, somgår utöfver denna grund och icke eger någon anknytningspunkt i lagens förfogande, saknar, huru berättigad densamma i och för sig än må förefalla, likväl, såsomicke omfattad af lagstiftarens medvetna vilja, lagens helgd och kan således ej få såsomhandlingsnormpå blott tolkningsskäl gälla.” Ibid. p. 99. Ekström 1924 pp. 55—59.
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