244 ment of the Finnish lawof proof thus followed the German one some decades later. For the purposes of this study, it may be concluded that at the time of the crucial change in the theories of proof at the practical legal level, the modern theories of legal sources were not yet there to constrain the active law-shaping function of the judiciary. Even though Wrede mentions the very abolition of the legal rules of proof as an example of how the courts still could, under certain conditions, act against written law, it seems that the example was given only to justify an already well-established practice. Theories of Interpretation- Towards Legal Modernity Like theories of legal sources, theories of interpretation only appear at the threshold of modernity. Also like the former, the latter are a consequence of written law’s preeminence. At the end of the eighteenth century, theories of legal interpretation were still quite simple and rudimentary. Calonius stressed the judges’s being bound to the letter of the law^^: “Insofar as legal interpretation is concerned, a judge must always bear in mind that he is a servant of the law' and not its master. Therefore, he must act in his office carefully, prudently, and understandingly so as not to give of himself the image that is assuming the lawgiver’s faculties.” Calonius did not, however, demand of the judiciary an absolute observance of a statute’s wording. He allowed for an extensive and restrictive interpretation, should “clear and obvious” reasons be at hand. If there were circumstances that the lawgiver would have taken into consideration had he paid attention to them, an excessively severe statute could be “repaired” or moderated using an extensive or restrictive interpretation. Moreover, in branches of lawin which statutory lawwas rare, such as civil law, the loopholes often had to be filled with natural law.27 Problems of legal interpretation did not concern the Finnish treatise writers during most of the nineteenth century. Apparently, problems of legal interpreration were not conceived of as problems at all. It was only with legal positivismthat this attitude changed, as the interpreter’s position vis-a-vis the starute needed to be defined. The first Finnish legal scholar to discuss statutory interpretation was Robert Montgomery in his “Textbook of Finland’s Private Law I-II” (“Handbok i Finlands allmänna privaträtt I-II”, first published in 1889 and 1895), in which a long chapter is devoted to the subject. Mont- “Oikeudellisessa tulkinnassa taas tuomarin on aina muistettava, että hän on lain palvelija eikä herra. Hänen tulee sen vuoksi menetellä tässä toimessaan varovasti, järkevästi ja ymmärtäväisesti ollakseen antamatta itsestään sitä käsitystä, että hän omaksuu itselleen lainsäätäjän valtuudet.” Calonius 1946 pp. 81-82. Ibid. pp. 81-85.
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