215 a prerequisite for the statutes of 1866 and 1889, and not vice versa. For the transformation of the law of proof, explanations of a deeper level are required. Before attempting them, I shall first inspect the evident similarities between the ideologies of classical criminal law and free evaluation of proof. Ideologies of Criminal Law: Classical Criminal Law and the Modern State In this subchapter, I will attempt to place the Finnish science of criminal law into a context of legal modernization. My central thesis is that, in this respect, important parallel developments between criminal law and the law of proof can be observed. As far as ideologies arc concerned, the dividing line between premodern and modern criminal law is clear. With the development of the so-called classical school with its roots in Enlightenment thinkers, such as Beccaria, Filangieri, and Feuerbach, criminal law gradually reached modernity during the nineteenth century; in short, it was with classicism that criminal law was first adapted to the needs of a modern, industrializing, and democratizing society. What was there before modern criminal law? First, premodern criminal law was uncodified. The sanctions were based not only on written law but on judicial discretion as welL^; this came to be one of the primary targets of Enlightenment criticismat the end of the eighteenth century. Second, the premodern systemof criminal law, instead of relyingprimarily on the prison sentence, was based on corporal sentences and fines. Premodern criminal lawwas largely justified by religious motives-*^; as to its effects, criminal justice, due to the unsystematic nature of crime detection, relied on terror.^® The modern criminal law which first emerged in the form of Enlightenment thinking and classical criminal justice law is based on the idea of general prevention. According to the logic of classical criminal law, if a criminal systemis to be effective fromthe point of viewof general prevention, sanctions have to be predictable. From this flow's the Legalitätsprinzip^ for in order to be predictable, the subjects of a legal order need to be aware of the sanctions that await them should they behave illegally. The decisions of the judiciary, then, need to be based on laws, and the laws, in order to effectively influence people’s behavior, must be available for everyone to acquaint themselves with (the principles of publicity and orality).^' If a punishment is to be predictable, it is logical that it be proportionate to the amount of guilt demonstrated by the See Mvinktell 1939 and 1940; Sehnapper 1973 and 1974; Langbein 1976; and Sehlosser 1988. On the roots of modern criminal law in the medieval canon law, see Kuttner 1935; on the connection between religion and criminal law in Sweden, see Nilsson 1993. Foucault 1977; Spierenburg 1984 p. 78; van Diilmen 1988. On the principle of legality in criminal law, sec Frände 1989. 15
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