211 become an impediment to the efficient functioning of the criminal procedural system. Furthermore, it is probable that the depth and extent to which the legal theory of proof was observed has varied considerably fromregion to region. The same is probably true as to what period the transformation fromthe statutory theory of proof to the free evaluation of evidence took place. In this study, however, a comparison of regional legal practices has not been possible. Third, it may well be asked whether the free evaluation of evidence was really always prone to rendering crime control more efficient. In other words, did free evaluation lower the threshold of conviction? The question cannot be answered affirmatively or negatively; the answer is more complex than that. The essence of the evidentiary transformation is that the middle categories of decision were cleaned out of the system. In the systemof free evaluation of evidence, the cases in the grey area - those that previously would have ended up in the categories of conditional acquittal, absolutio ab instantia and confessional imprisonment — were now divided into the only existing categories, those of conviction and acquittal. But they were not distributed evenly. The accused who previously would have been condemned to confessional imprisonment ended up convicted under the new system. The same is true for many of those who previously would have ended up in the category of absolutio ab instantia. On the other hand, those previously conditionally acquitted were, in the systemof free evaluation of evidence, acquitted. Since the categories of confessional imprisonment and absolutio ab instantia forma clear majority of all the cases in the grey area, it seems that the adoption of free evaluation of evidence ensured convictions as far as homicidal criminality is concerned. But this is a one-sided conclusion as well, for we must not forget that even in the old system, those placed in confessional imprisonment were factually punished as well. The conditionally acquitted, however, were set free. In other words and when taken as a whole, fromthe point of view of practical crime control, the change from the legal theory of proof to free evaluation of evidence may not have been as significant as it seems. Instead, the new systemof evidence evaluation, together with the subjectification taking place in the theory of the structure of the crime, allowed the crime control to be allocated on a more individualized and, therefore, on a more efficient basis. It seems, then, that the ebbs and flows of criminality itself bequeathed little influence to the development of the law of proof. As regards the Finnish nineteenth-century history of crime, no general pattern of change can be discerned, and the variations observed in no way match the changes in the law of proof. Besides, it seems doubtful whether free evaluation of proof is, in the first place, conducive to a tightening of the control system at all. Instead of becoming tighter, the penal systembecame more effective during the nineteenth century. Of that modernization process, the emergence of the free evaluation of proof formed part and parcel. Before turning to the other indispensable part of that
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