197 fession usually played no role in the case, unless the accused could establish that he or she had been, for instance, forced to confess. As to the details of the crime, a confession, in order to lead to conviction, did not need to be precise: it was often enough if the accused admitted to having at least in some way breached the victim’s physical Integrity, especially if there were circumstantial evidence to substantiate to support the accusation. Most importantly, extrajudicial confessions - against the express wording of the Law of 1734 — were often equalled to confessions given in court. Examples of all these ways to treat confession can be found in the case material of the second half of the century as well.' If the accused’s confession was a matter of wide interpretation in the first half of the century, the same can be said about witness evidence. The requirement of concurrence between the two eyewitnesses was not always understood strictly; this practice continued onto the second half of the century.^ The Decline of Intermediate Categories of Decision The most characteristic feature that reveals the move from the legal theory of proof to free evaluation of evidence is, thus, the way higher courts gradually caused using the middle categories after the 1850s. Whereas still in 1850 a majority of cases without full proof ended up in the middle categories in the practice of the higher instances, from1855 onwards the accused in general was convicted in similar cases (tables 10-19), so that by the sample year 1890 the middie categories had become rarities in the practice of all instances (table 17). My material suggests that the move resulted mostly in increased levels of conviction, but acquittals increased as well: whereas in the era of legal proof no ' For an extrajudicial confession as the probable basis of conviction, see Abrahamsson, pag. 112/1864; Fiolm, pag. 15/1865; Antikainen, pag. 250/1865; Lempiäinen, pag. 296/1875; Korpikoski, pag. 385/1885; Gustafsson, pag. 196/1885; and Niemi, pag. 349/1885. For a conviction based on a limited confession, see Fager, pag. 202/1860; Pietila, pag. 475/1860, Åkerman, pag. 150/1861; Weekström, pag. 290/1869; Kauppinen, pag. 239/1870; Saxberg, pag. 475/1874; Jäkkä, pag. 104/1875; Anttila, pag. 297/1875; Berglund, pag. 3/1880; Piispanen, pag. 158/ 1880; Korkecnalanen, pag. 195/1885, Sahlström, pag. 296/1890; and Knuutila, pag. 474/1890. Recanted confessions are far less numerous in the material of the second half of 1800s. See, however, Martinm.äki, pag. 139/1885; and Jansson, pag. 358/1895. On the contrary, cases in which the accused confesses but claims having acted in self-defence abound. See Finnoja, pag. 343/1860; Kitinoja, pag. 397/1864; Pihlström, pag. 138/1865; Söder, pag. 427/1865; Svanberg, pag. 523/1865; Andila, pag. 220/1875; Lindholm, pag. 380/1875; Leinonen, pag. 21/1885; Rocklin, pag. 205/1895; Strömberg, pag. 426/1885; Cederqvist, pag. 410/1895; Thurc, pag. 425/1895; and Parviainen, pag. 77/1900. - For cases in which a conviction has been based on two or more eyewitnesses the concurrence of which is questionable, see Rånman, pag. 312/1864; Mäki, pag. 428/1865; Pellas, pag. 502/1865; Lauren, pag. 360/1875; Werkniemi, pag. 88/1880; Abrahamsson, pag. 96/1880; Ahlsktig, pag. 185/ 1885; and Fdolm, pag. 335/1885.
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