183 of the case, and not a final decision. When it came to crimes punishable by death, a high court or theJDS could, in addition toahsolutio ah instantia, then propose to the emperor that he order the accused to confessional imprisonment as well. In the practical decision-making of the courts the two were often seen as mutual alternatives, the choice of which depended on the weight of the evidence. Frequently, votes were taken to decide between ahsolutio ah instantia and confessional imprisonment.-'’^ This is no wonder when the practical consequences of the two are considered; ahsolutio ah instantia meant that the accused went free, whereas confessional imprisonment could lead to several decades of imprisonment. The decision-making on confessional imprisonment offers a good example of the complicated Imperial Russian bureaucracy. Lower courts were not allowed recourse to confessional imprisonment. Functionally, ahsolutio ah instantia and confessional imprisonment belonged together, so that the former was a requisite for the use of the latter; in order for the confessional imprisonment to be used, the case had to be left pending by using absolutio ah instantia. The cases which came into question had to carry a death penalty; moreover, “more than half a proof” had to be at hand (PS 17:32). Besides the PS, two statutes, passed on fromthe Swedish era, regulated confessional imprisonment in autonomous Finland. According to the Royal Ordinance of January 1, 1779, a case could in certain cases be taken up again had evidence remained short of full proof in the first place. Among others, all crimes carrying a death penalty belonged to this category. It was the so-called “leuteration statute” (the Royal Letter to the High Court of March 22, 1803) that, although it had mainly to do with leuteration and had been given in order to harmonize the disharmonious high court practice in those matters, came to regulate the use of confessional imprisonment in the nineteenth century.^' The 1803 statute is concise, however, thus offering little advice to the courts, as far as the law of proof was concerned; it is therefore not likely to have contributed to harmonizing the use of confessional imprisonment to the desired extent. In article 4 of the statute, it states that confessional imprisonment could be used when the accused was “almost proven guilty” (“i det närmaste öfvertygad”), but denied the charges. In addition, — if set free — the accused’s “maliciousness” {^"ondska och vanart”) would have to be seen as endangering public security. In these cases, the accused could be imprisoned. According to the 1803 statute, the high court had to refer the matter of confessional imprisonment to the king; in autonomous Finland, then, it was the emperor who made the final decision. Although several other matters of criminal lawwere, at different times, delegated to theJDS and to the governor general to decide, decisions on confessional imprisonment were retained in the emperor’s personal sphere of power.^^ Furthermore, the general legal provisions concern5“^ Sec for instance Rossa, pag. 72/1824; Rehn, pag. 36/1825; Määttänen, pag. 195/1830; Romar, pag. 171/1835; and Hyvönen, pag. 388/1845. Sec the case of Malachias Rihojärvi who was ordered to confessional imprisonment in 1820 and was not freed until 1846; the case cited in Backman 1984 pp. 163-164, 755. *’* Inger 1976 (b) pp. 49-50. ft-! Rauhala 1915 pp. 135,200-201. i.i
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