170 proof, a permissive attitude toward the limits of a lawful confession developed within the Finnish legal theory of proof. In other words, because of the (in principle) strict requirement of confession as the basis of conviction, the very definition of confession tended to be formulated extensively in legal practice. This becomes clear when extrajudicial confessions, recanted confessions, limited confessions, and qualified confessions are inspected. Together I shall call these imperfect confessions. Extrajudicial Confessions Of imperfect confessions, the extrajudicial confession - a confession given somewhere else than in front of the court - was, according to the Lawof 1734 and the ius commune doctrine,^'* sufficient as circumstancial evidence only. In order to suffice for full proof, confession had to be renewed in court.-^ However, the Finnish court practice was more permissive than the juristic writing: already in the period of legal proof, in some cases, the court clearly based its conviction on an extrajudicial conviction, although the weight attached to an extrajudicial confession is not always easy to assess. In the following cases, the conviction has been either outrightly based on an extrajudicial conviction or such a confession has doubtlessly been the decisive piece of evidence. In 1830, a case against soldier Carl Hjelt came before theJDS. Hjelt was accused of killing his brother, crofter Thomas Thomasson Aijälä. The Hundred Court of Hollola etc. heard ten witnesses in the case, but no eyewitnesses nor confession was available. Before the trial Hjelt had, however, told five witnesses that he had killed his brother. Moreover, the witness evidence showed convincingly that Hjelt had, at the approximate time of the killing, been close to the site of the crime. No one else could plausibly be suspected of the crime. On the December 18, 1829 the Hundred Court condemned Hjelt to death on MS 24:9, basing the sentence on the extrajudicial confession (“... according to the statements of the witnesses heard in court, confessed ...”). The conviction stood in the upper instances (the High Court of Turku, January 23, 1830; theJDS, April 2, 1830; pag. 55/1830).26 PS 17:29. 2'* Nehrman 1759 p. 83; Calonius 1813; Lévv 1939 p. 56. Lévy 1939 p. 129. ... enligt de i målet afhörde vittnens berättelser, erkänt ...”. See also the case of Palm pag. 309/1849; Siiroin pag. 18/1830, which is not quite as clear because of other plentiful evidence which may have affected the decision; and Paunonen and Pövhönen, pag. 113/1850, where both of the accused were convicted on the grounds of a w-itness who stated that one of the accused (Paunonen) had confessed extrajudicially for both of them. In this case, the lower court decided on conviction, but the upper instances settled for ahsolutio ab instantia and confessional imprisonment. As a decisional ground for conviction, an extrajudicial confession has played a decisive role in one or more instances also in Saxberg, pag. 81/1836; Sirck, pag. 66/1835; Johansson and Andersson, pag. 28/1839; Johansson, pag. 295/1840; Ketolain, pag. 80/1841; Nikkala and Korkiakoski, pag. 202/1846; Maunu, pag. 35/1845; and Mehtälä, pag. 566/1845. 26 «
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