169 the choice of legal sources and interpretatic')n of statutes both spring fromthis basic attitude. In premodernity, on the contrary, no closed theory of legal sources existed. The focus of legal decision-making was the case itself, according to the needs of which the hierarchical order of legal sources was, in principie, chosen and remade each and every time. Therefore, written statutes could in the practice of certain instances be by-passed; against this background, deviations of what seems a permanent practice become understandable. Were there, then, any traces of the legal theory of proof in the lower court practice? Certainly there were, but the influence of the theory seems mostly to be restricted to legal phraseology and the wording of the decisions. Whenever full proof required by statute was available, the courts keenly formulated their ciecisions accordingly''^; their practical evidence evaluation was, on the contrary, hardly affected or strained at all by the law of proof established in the PS of 1734. Clearly, the legal theory of proof in Finland was a phenomenon restricted first and foremost to the upper court instances. Therefore, in the following an emphasis will be placed on the practice of the high courts and theJDS. Confession as a Method of Proof: Extensive Interpretation Prevails In the evidentiary apparatus of the statutory theory of proof, the position of confession has always been dominant. In Sweden, Finland, and elsewhere, confession was “the queen of proof.” Clearly, it was to obtain confession that the whole criminal process was arranged.Moreover, the standard phrase used m connection to the carrying out of the death sentences during the first half of the nineteenth century demonstrates the importance attributed to the confession. After pronouncing the death sentence, the court at times ordered that the convicted, prior to the execution, be “urged to a true and sincere confession” before God’s eyes.-' For holding up the religious credo, confession was, thus, considered important even after the judicial case had already been decided. In practice, more important was, however, the clergy’s responsibility of contributing to the persuading the accused to confess; various eighteenthcentury statutes confirmed this duty.-- Because of the weight placed on the confession within the legal theory of The judiciary’s inclination to formulate the grounds of decision to correspond to the statute is not limited to the period of legal proof; the tendency seems, however, to diminish as the free evaluation of proof gains ground in the second half of the century. C/. Kemppinen 1992 p. 407. Nousiainen 1993 p. 400. ... uppmanad till en sann och uppriktig bekännelse.” -- The Roc-al Letters of December 8, 1700; April 22, 1724; July 11, 1753; and November 27, 1798. Inger 1976 (b) pp. 45-46. 21 “
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