148 the paragraph {rules ofproof, doctrine ofimputation), decide whether such a case lies at hand or not, and in the former case to pronounce the norms provided therefore, and in the latter case to reject the charges as unproven.”’-'' Thus, it flowed fromthe passiveness of the judge that he was not entitled to evaluate facts freely. Obviously, a trial jury would have fitted this context poorly. At the time of the writing of “Omföreträdet,” Ehrstrom’s judiciary was made up of judges of the old world; suspicious and in the need of constant supervision. His judiciary was, clearly, not part of an organized profession, based on education criteria, and his modernity carried an enlightened, rather than a liberal tint. In 1854, Ehrströmoperated on the threshold of commencing liberalism, but still within an old-fashioned conservative state ruled by an absolute monarch, a systemthat allowed only restricted discretion for the judiciary. As for Montesquieu, it was at this point that Ehrstrbm’s solution to bring in the adversarial principle to remedy the problems of the old systementered. In spite of being a well-known Hegelian, Ehrström rejected his teacher’s views on all major points regarding criminal procedure. Hegel supported juries, Ehrström turned them down; whereas the German idealist campaigned for free evaluation of proof, Ehrström preferred the statutory theory; and although Hegel allowed the state a rather strong role in criminal procedure, the Finnish reformer wished to clean every trace of inquisitorial principle out of the systemof the criminal procedure.-"^ Why did Ehrström choose to depart so radically from Hegel and the German modernizers of criminal procedure with whom he was so well acquainted? His preferences - professionals to juries, statutory proof to free evaluation - are, again, no coincidence. When seen against the rather narrow intellectual confines of the pre-1860s Finland,--’ Ehrström’s choices become understandable. As a licenciate thesis writer, he had to take into consideration the prevailing Finnish views toward such a revolutionary idea as a jury or free evaluation of evidence. By emphasizing the judiciary’s commitment to the letter of the law, Ehrström chooses, at this point, to go the other way. But the times were changing, and Ehrström’s thinking reflects that transformation. In 1860, Ehrströmwas appointed professor ordinarius at the Faculty of Lawat Imperial Czar Alexander’s University in Helsinki. Following the asIbid. pp. 59-60. “... pröfva, huruvida de itrågakommandc rättsfallen verkligen vore de, hvilka lagen uti sina rättsbud afsåge, eller ej, samt för att uttala lagens deromgifna stadgande ... hans åliggande innebure således också intet annat, än att ... på grund af de kännetecknen, lagen uppställt för det i käromålet afsedda rättsfallets tillvaro {bcvisningsreglorna, imputationsläran), pröfva om detsamma funnes för handen eller ej, och i det förra fallet uttala lagens derom meddelade bud, i sednare fallet förkasta käromålet såsomobestyrkt.” -■* Hegel 1994 pp. 193—194 (§§227—228); Ehrström 1854 p. 48, where the author criticizes Hegel for an insufficient comprehension of the adversarial principle in his theorv. See Liikanen 1995 pp. 90-94.
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