145 imprisonment). According to Calonius, torture proper had never been adopted into the Swedish laws, but improper means of torture were used with the King’s permission in cases involving a threat to public security.*'* As for the role of confession and its legal requisites, Calonius followed the continental ius commune doctrine. Confession was actually no evidence at all, and in order to be valid, it needed to be given freely in court by a person of lawful age and sound mind.'^ In his activities as the Supreme Court Justice, Calonius adhered closely to the letter of the statute (PS 17:36) according to which confession alone did not suffice for conviction in criminal cases but had to be accompanied by indicia.'^ Calonius required full proof; if it was not at hand, the accused was acquitted, or cine of the middle decision categories used.*^ Calonius’s essay on confession in criminal cases, together with his lectures on criminal procedure, depict the Swedish statutory theory of proof: what we see here is a simplified version of the common European doctrine. Calonius’s statements as a Supreme Court Justice substantiate the same argument, and show that at least Calonius adhered closely to the doctrine as he himself presented it and as we have seen it evolve in Sweden and other parts of Europe. As to confessional imprisonment, Calonius employs it in his court opinions consistently with the letter of the law and his own theoretical formulations.*** It is evident that Calonius, in his theory, adhered closely to the statutory theory of proof, although the theory was presented in a form similar to that which had been developed elsewhere in Europe by the nineteenth century. The point is, however, that no signs of criticism against the existing systemof legal proof appeared in the sparse legal literature before the middle of the century. In this respect, Finland was very different from continental Europe and Sweden; while there was never any actual discussion on the merits of the jury in Finland, in the other countries the debate had already started in the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century. The Enlightenment and liberal criticismto the ancien régime law of proof was not rejected by coincidence. The social conditions that in Germany and '■* Ibid. pp. 286, 299, 300. Calonius (Civil Procedure) p. 74; Calonius 1813 p. 52. See Calonius 1829-1836 IV pp. 102—107 (Aug 1, 1796) for an incest case, and pp. 250—252 and pp. 430-432 for two identical sodomy cases confirming this (Aug. 14, 1797; April 24, 1798). See ibid. pp. 182—188 (April 3, 1797) for a manslaughter case which was practically clear but based on circumstantial evidence only. For Calonius, the accused had to be convicted of a more easily demonstrable lesser category of offense. See ibid. pp. 222—225 GuK' 7, 1797), for a case of manslaughter and ibid. pp. 357-359 Ganuary 19, 1798), for an embezzlement case in both of which Calonius declined to convict on the basis of circumstantial evidence solely. See also two cases of theft, ibid. pp. 400-403 (March 14, 1798), and ibid. pp. 418-420 (March 28, 1798). Sec the cases ot Januars’ 19, 1798; January 7, 1799; and September 3, 1799; ibid. pp. 351-354, 93-94, 194-198.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=