140 between. Thus, no working forumexisted to effectively channel the reformattempts and distribute ideas. The debates and controversies that could be brought into the open in Sweden remained hidden in Finland. In Sweden, there were early - although unsuccessful - efforts to modernize legal procedure. If procedural reforms were difficult to discuss in Finland because of a lack of the workable forum, all the more impossible would legislative reforms during the first half of the century have been. Had a political willingness to reform criminal procedure existed, because of the long “stateless night” following the Diet in 1809 until the reign of Alexander II in the 1860s, no legislative forum existed for that purpose. Furthermore, there were differences as to the depth and the scope of liberalism in the two countries. Even though both countries lacked large cities and, thus, a powerful bourgeoisie, in Sweden the liberal ideas made themselves more visible during the first half of the century than they did in Finland.-^ Moreover, Finland’s autonomous position within the Russian autonomy created a tremendous need for legal professionals which thus made the role of the legal profession unique. The distinctiveness of the Finnish legal corps ought not to be overestimated, however; in close connection to the building of the modern state, the professionalization of the legal corps took place in other countries, too. 10. Conclusion of Comparison: France, Germany, and Sweden What can we gather fromthe French, German, and Swedish experiences? In the French transition from the legal theory of proof to the free evaluation of evidence, the link between politics and the lawof proof is exposed at its barest. The legal rules of proof were abandoned because they formed part and parcel of the hierarchical judicial systemof the ancien régime. In that system, the absolute ruler had the need to control the judiciary; as for the bourgeois layers of society, they had no interest in vesting the judiciary, dependent on the ruler, with the right to freely evaluate evidence. When this hierarchy collapsed, the rules of proof went with it. In the post-revolutionary bourgeois society, the bourgeoisie claimed judicial power as well. In the post-revolutionary society, it was the bourgeoisie which held power and therefore had less need to control the juries consisting of its own members. Neither did the “people,” the eligible bourgeois voters, at least in theory, have any legitimacy doubts as to the juries that consisted of its own members. Since jurors were laymen by definition, they could not be expected to be able to master a complex set of legal rules of proof. On ninctcenth-ccntur\' liberalismin Finland, sec Liikanen 1995 pp. 107-108, 119-123.
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