130 double standard was set for the modern procedure in the nineteenth century, as a human being was now seen as a “citizen of two worlds.” On the one hand, the human being was nowunderstood as a creature dependent on natural causation; on the other hand, he began to be seen as a freely acting agent, morally responsible for his deeds. In philosophy, this partition is represented by Kant.55 As we shall see below (Chapter 11), from the point of viewof Finnish criminal procedure, the connection between substantive criminal law and the law of proof is of paramount significance. The division of Tatbestände into subjective and objective components is an essential element of the modernization of criminal law and a concrete formof this subjectification tendency. It is a bourgeois way of imputing criminal responsibility as accurately as possible to the “right” person, instead of relying only on the facts perceivable to the eye. Just as one of the central facets of the liberal social and political thought was to allow everyone an equal chance of “making it” in life, it was criminal law that came to back up this thought from the reverse side. If everyone was to pursue his or her fortune as freely and equally as possible, then let themalso be morally responsible for what they do. Flence, in classical criminal law, individuals came to be conceived of as free agents, morally responsible and to be sentenced for their deeds according to the exact amount of responsibility that could be imputed to them. To obtain a sufficient degree of preciseness, one had to get “inside the suspect’s head,” and to this end, then, the subjective components of Tatbestand were imperative. Without a remodelling of the existing punishment systembased on corporal punishments, death sentences and pecuniary sentences, the new mode of exact guilt determination would have been useless. Not surprisingly, therefore, the prison sentence came to dominate the system of punishment virtually everywhere in Europe during the nineteenth century.5^ However, the division of Tatbestände was not workable without a corresponding system of evidence, a systemthat would be designed to provide for the information that was needed for the theory of crime. The free evaluation of evidence was such a theory: it could uncover the very facts that were not met by the eye. The German discussion of the beginning nineteenth century shows clearly that just as classical criminal law came to mark the modernization of criminal law, so free evaluation of evidence was the procedural side of the same phenomenon. 55 Nousiaincn 1993 pp. 189-191. 5<’ On the rise of the modern penitentiary system; see Rothman 1971, Foucault 1977, Ignatieff 1978, Mclossi - Pavarini 1981, Kekkonen - Ylikangas 1982.
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