94 duced to those of the central government. Among the higher court judges, the level and frequency of legal education rose considerably towards the end of the century; obviously, this was likely to contribute to their diminishing tolerance towards the medieval systemof oaths and ordeals on one hand, and towards a growing enthusiasm, on the other, for the early modern version of the statutory theory of proof which allowed the judiciary a considerable scope of free evaluation in the form of absolutio ab instantia poena extraordinaria. It is no wonder, therefore, that the reception of the statutory theory of proof initiated in high courts and in their practice. The third level to be distinguished consists of the lower courts and subjects of the legal system, the people. Fromtheir point of view, the ongoing “judicial revolution” was likelv to be understood as an attack on or an intervention into the traditional kin-based social structures fromthe side of the central government, taking away the traditional methods of problemsolving.Thedifficulties and the incompleteness of the “judicial revolution” is demonstrated by the studies of Munktell,'^' Thunander*^- and Inger'^^ which show that the lower courts often deviated fromthe requirements of legal proof. The use of private settlements continued in fact at least until the end of sixteenth century,’^'^ and the oath process, at least to some extent, until the end of the century.Interestingly, we run into the same lax attitude towards the legal rules of proof in the lower courts again in the Finnish theorv of the law of proof at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In practice the theory of legal proofs did not work as efficiently as the power elite would have wished. Moreover, the local judiciary needed ways of coping with crime. In the countryside, the courts probably felt strong pressure “to do something” when a crime was detected. If no legal full proof was at hand, then private settlement, poena extrarordinaria, or even a regular punishment was applied. A corresponding phenomenon is clearly noticeable in the nineteenth-century court material (see Chapters 12 and 13). Conclusion Legal historical studies have shown that the statutory theory of proof filtered into the Swedish legal practice in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The reception, thus, coincides with the creation of the centralized administrative On the concept of “judicial revolution” in general, see Lenman-Parker 1980. >81 Munktell 1939 and 1940. ’S- Thunander 1993. 18C 1S3 Inger 1976 (b). Ylikangas 1976 (a). 185 The 184 use of oath-helpers was expressly forbidden in 1695. Förordning huruledes med Edegdnger wid Domstolarne förhållas skal, October 30, 1695; Schmedeman 1706 p. 1429.
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