90 in the Swedish Lawof 1734 (PS 17:37), and in the Royal Letter of King Gustav III on August 27, 17724^^ Inger has remarked that the Lawof 1734 (PS 17: 37) contains a general prohibition against torture, but also an exception to it (PS 17:37):”... AJudge or a Governor may not let anyone be tormented to confess; should so be done, let the responsible pay. As for serious crimes the Judge may attempt with hard imprisonment to reveal the truth when binding circumstances are at hand against the accused: however, let theJudge act carefully thereby.” (PS 17: 37)*^° Inger’s study proves, without doubt, that violent methods and force were indeed used to extract confessions of accused persons in early modern Sweden. But was that the same as judicial torture? Much depends, of course, on the definition of judicial torture that one adopts. Ylikangas and Calonius include confessional imprisonment within the definition of torture, or at least functionally equate these two. If this is done, the difference between Sweden and the continent largely disappears. This approach seems tempting, for, as this study has shown so far for the law of proof, upon closer inspection most of what may at first sight look like national characteristics often turn out to neatly fit an international pattern: as legal theorv of proof spread, so spread torture with it. In my opinion, however, it is worthwhile in this context to pay attention to the peculiarities of the Swedish law of proof as well. The “functional approach,” indeed, misses out on something important, for I think there is a reason why Stiernhöök and Nehrman say that torture was “never” used in Sweden. Ample evidence exists to prove that torture was indeed employed in Sweden during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and even eighteenth centuries. As the studies of Munktell and Inger show, however, the use of torture was limited mainly to the Cityof Stockholm; traces of torture inthe hundred courts are scarce.*^' The main conclusion that Munktell draws, then, is that torture came to be used only exceptionally in Sweden, and that it practically disappeared by the 1740s and 1750s.’^- Inger 1976 (b) p. 34. 170 Inger 1976 (b) pp. 31-34. “... Ej må Domare, eller Betalningshafvande låta någon til bekännelse pinas och plågas: giör thet någor; plichte somsaken är til. I grofva brottmål må Domaren försöka med svårare fängelse, at få sanningen i Huset, ther bindande liknelser och omständigheter finnas emot then, som anklagad är: förfare doch ther med varsamliga”. This contradiction was noted by Hundred Court Judge Petter Abrahamsson in his comment on one of the law drafts; ibid. p. 31. 169 See also Ylikangas 1984 pp. 58-59 and 1986 pp. 88-89, according to whomtorture was used to a more limited extent in Sweden than in continental Europe. Munktell 1939; Inger 1976 (b) pp. 30-35. Torture was, although rarelv used in the seventeenth-century witchcraft cases. See Heikkinen 1969 pp. 204-243, 359 (Finland, particularly the Åland islands); Kervinen 1983 pp. 106-107 (Finland); Ankarloo 1984 pp. 67-76 (Sweden); and Sörlin 1993 pp. 53—57 (Sweden); and Johansen 1991 p. 21 (Denmark). According to Naess (1982 pp. 203-213), however, torture was rather commonly employed in the Norwegian witchcraft cases. Another important group of cases in which torture was employed were state crimes; sec Munktcll 1939.
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