296 humanize penal justice. Even when the law clearly stated that the severest punishment should be imposed, the high court ignored the law and mitigated the sentence. This happened 109 times in the years 1681—1699. It can also be put in the following terms: on 109 occasions the court judged according to what it considered “right and proper” {rätt och billig, as opposed to following the letter of the law) and in harmony with the local community’s view of the offender. Naturally, one can find inconsistencies in the 1,774 decisions taken by Göta High Court in the periods studied here. The high court had its flaws, and some people suffered as a result of oversights in its judgements. The court made mistakes. Yet it also passed a great many conscientious and sympathetic judgements. 5. The high court of 1614 pass judgements against which no one could appeal. It became possible for civil cases to be reviewed, which meant that the high court became an intermediate instance. As regards cases of serious crime, however, the development was different, with the result that in practice the high court was the ultimate judge in 94 per cent of cases involving the question of life or death. Admittedly, it was supposed in principle to refer all death sentences to the King in Council, but the rules for this were relaxed at an early stage. When Göta High Court began its work in 1635, it had the possibility of either confirming a death sentence or showing mercy by revoking it (leuterera) and simultaneously commuting it {arbitrera) to another penalty. Only in special cases did it need to refer any case to the King in Council. During the three periods in the seventeenth century which have been excerpted, 1,342 death sentences were referred to the high court by the three counties of Småland. A study of the high court’s choice of the possible alternatives shows that in only 80 cases, or 6 per cent, were the circumstances such that they were referred to the King in Council. Given such proportions between referred and unreferred cases, one might expect that the cases referred to the King in Council involved special circumstances, but this does not appear to have been the case very often. There is little difference between referred and unreferred cases, and often they seem identical. The reason for referring a case may have been a desire to have the superior authority approve the high court’s application of the law. Perhaps it was more a wish for legitimacy than uncertainty about the concrete circumstances of a case. The referral of cases can also be given a political and symbolic meaning as a confirmation of the relationship between the King in Council as the decision-making authority and the high court as an administrative body. became a king’s court in the sense that it could never
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=