46 men owing service, that is, the dvoriane and the deti hoiarskie, were divided up among the new units primarily according to their wealth. The poorer members were enrolled as infantry soldiers, while the dvoriane and deti hoiarskie who had some land were entered into the military rolls as lancers and cavalrymen. One remnant of the old army order did, however, remain. The more wealthy members of the middle service class (the dvoriane and deti hoiarskie owning more than twenty-four households) were to retain their former positions and to perform the same service as in the past (the so-called sotennaia sluzhha). However, this group is not very interesting in this context, since it constituted nothing more than a steadily diminishing minority. The new regiments were given uniform armaments and a uniform organization which was retained in peacetime, as well as in time of war. But this was not a regular standing army in the true sense of the term, since the newly formed regiments of the foreign type were not kept under arms in peacetime, but were to be sent home at the end of a campaign."*^ Nor was it possible, for financial reasons, to abandon units of the old order altogether. No solution to the problem of how all the troops were to be supplied while in the field had yet been found, but, as Richard Hellie has pointed out, the importance of the reformlay especially in the fact that the duality between the old cavalry forces and the regiments of the new type, which had existed from time to time in the Russian military since the Russo-Polish war at the beginning of the 1630s, was now rejected in principle.'*^ A regular standing army maintained by tax revenues both in peacetime and in war did not become a reality in Russia until the beginning of the eighteenth century. Military developments in Russia during the seventeenth century can be illustrated with the following figures: non-existent in 1650, military units of the new type numbered 60,000 men in 1663 and 80,000 in 1681 (plus 2,500 officers). These units consisted principally of InfantryThe rapid growth of the number of troops supported by state funds caused a comparable expansion of what one might refer to as the public sector of the Russian economy. Between 1630 and 1670, the costs involved in maintaining the army during peacetime rose from275,000 rubles to 700,000 rubles per annum, the latter amount constituting half of the state expend!- tures for that year. Comparable figures for military costs during wartime are not available, but it may be pointed out that the total cost of salaries for the active army amounted to approximately one million rubles in ■** N. P. Pavlov-Sil’vanskii, Gosudarevy sluzhilye liudi (2nd ed., St. Petersburg, 1909), 209—211. “'■* Hellie, 221. ■*5 Ibid., 200.
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