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44 usually confronted with petitions from noblemen who were unhappy with their assignments. It is not difficult to imagine how such a system of making appointments, if rigidly adhered to, could have very negative effects on the combat morale and military effectiveness of the Russian army. During the seventeenth century, the Russian government became aware of the risks in this system and on several different occasions declared that battle would be waged “without places” {bez mest), that is to say that the rank order among the different families would be suspended during the campaigns in question.^** At pace with the technological and tactical innovations (the development of firearms and linear tactics) that characterized the armies of Western Europe, however, the cavalry of noble servicemen became increasingly obsolete as a military force.^' This new type of warfare, based as it was on the use of firearms, required specially trained standing armies. The Russian nobiliary cavalry had none of these qualities. At the threat of war the cavalry and its supporting troops first had to be mobilized, which was a time-consuming process. And once the cavalry units had been mobilized their weaponry proved to be extremely diverse. Since the Russian cavalryman did not adapt himself completely to the use of handguns, the traditional bows and arrows were frequently carried by the Russian forces during the second half of the seventeenth centuryThen, too, discipline was weak in view of the fact that military training was almost non-existent. Nor had the tactics of the Russian forces undergone any significant changes since the struggles with the Tartars in the fifteenth century. Another weak point, finally, was the manner in which the military units were supplied during wartime. Each cavalryman was to bring along a supply of food and other provisions for his own support and for that of the foot soldiers he was required to bring with him. With such a supply system, of course, the troops were unable to support themselves for very long, since no single cavalryman could bring enough food and materials to last for the duration of a long campaign. Therefore, when the supplies had been consumed and the battle zone had been stripped of food, chaotic conditions were likely to arise.^^ The inability of the Muscovite army to measure up in strength and effectiveness to the standing armies of Russia’s neighbors became apparent in the wars with Sweden and Poland during the first decades of the sevenss Pipes, 91. •*' For military developments in Western Europe, sec Michael Roberts, “The Military Revolution, 1560—1660,’’ Essays in Swedish History (London &: Minneapolis, 1967), 195—223. *** Hellie, 211, 223. »» Ibid., 216—217.

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