RB 29

43 The tax reform described above was followed by a restructuring of the fiscal administration, which was characterized above all by the concentration of tax collection duties in a smaller number of prikazy. The collection of the most important indirect taxes was charged to the Prikaz Bol'shoi kazny, which thereby gained a leading position in the fiscal administration, while responsibility for collecting the new direct taxes, the streletskaia podaP and the iamskaia podaP, was given to the Strclctskii and lamskoi prikazy, respectively. In 1680, in order to gain a more complete overview of the financial situation, the calculations of the various prikazy concerning their incomes and expenditures were brought together in the form of a joint financial estimate.^^ The tax and administrative reforms of 1679—80 were brought on by the constantly rising costs of the military establishment, which had changed character during the seventeenth century. A major component of the Muscovite army was the cavalry of noble servicemen, who received their support in the form of service estates {pomesPe). The members of this cavairy were released from duty during peacetime to conduct the affairs of their estates, but when Moscow called for a mobilization they were required to report for military duty with their horses, their weapons, and the foot soldiers they were obligated to bring with them.^“ The rules of mestnichestvo were even enforced among noblemen serving in these cavalry forces, which meant that the tsar, in making military appointments, had to take into consideration the relative positions of honor (chesP) of the persons in question. Thus, the determining factor for gaining a command was not demonstrated ability to perform the task at hand, but rather the birth of the person being considered and his own and his ancestors’ service careers. For this purpose, then, accurate registers of the various noble families and of their members’ internal ranking were maintained. In principle, the tsar followed these registers when appointing military commanders, but if anyone felt he had been placed in a position that was too low in comparison with someone else, he immediately submitted a petition to the tsar requesting that the mistake be rectified. Maintenance of a family’s position in the social hierarchy required that none of its members serve under the command of someone whose family was of lower rank. On the eve of military campaigns, therefore, the tsar was ■■■* Pavel Miliukov, Gosudarstvcnnoe kboziaistvo Rossii v pcrvoi chctvcrti 18-go stolctiia i reforma Petra Velikogo (2nd ed., St. Petersburg, 1905), 78; Bogoslovskii, III, 247; and S. M. Troitskii, “Finansovaia politika russkogo absoliutizma vo vtoroi polovine XVII i XVIII vv.,” in N. M. Druzhinin et al., eds., Absolintizm v Rossii (XVII—XVIII V.). Sbornik statei k 70-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia i 40-letiiu nauchnoi i pedagogicheskoi deiateVnosti B. B. Kafengauza (Moscow, 1964), 283. A. V. Chernov, “Vooruzhennye sily,” Ocherki (1955), 440.

RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=