239 affairs.^® But it was the rule, rather than the exception, that governors did not administer their guhernii in person. In these cases, the practical tasks were supervised by a deputy appointed by the governor himself.^** The guherniia was divided into districts, or uezdy, which were governed by commandants. This level of the administrative organization was probably not changed very much by the reform. The commandants served in the same towns where the voevodas had previously served, and it has even been shown that in many instances the only change that took place was that the voevoda currently serving was given the title of commandant.®** The commandant had the very same authority as that granted to the voevoda. He was to collect taxes and was to carry out administrative, military, and judicial tasks. As was the case with the voevoda, the commandant served as the first judicial instance and carried out the decisions and judgements made by the central administrative organs.®* There was, however, one important difference between the voevoda and the commandant, since, in the interest of the central state authority, the latter’s administration was supervised with the help of military units. The guards regiments in particular were used for this purpose. In 1712, an additional administrative unit, the provintsiia, or province, was introduced as an intermediate authority between the guherniia administration and the commandants. The province was governed by an oberkomendant.^- In addition to all the officials mentioned above, commissaries and chief inspectors were charged with responsibilities chiefly involving the collection of taxes.®'* Considerations of military finance have often been mentioned as the basic reason for the introduction of the guherniia reform.®'* A decentralization of the collection of taxes would allow better control of the activities of the voevodas and would increase the efficiency of tax collection, especially of those taxes destined for the military, since the time-consuming detour via Moscow would be eliminated.®'’’ There is no doubt that this consideration was of prime importance. In the source materials emanating from this period, there are numerous examples of concern for the maintenance of the armed forces. In August Slitsan, 322. Miliukov, 294 note 4. Bogoslovskii (1903), 57. Ibid., 58—59. **-’ Slitsan, 323. Ibid., loc.cit. See above, p. 56. V. O. Kliuciievskii, Kurs russkoi istorii (4 v., Moscow, 1904—1910), IV, 203—206.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=